

INTRODUCTION

The Board of Inquiry to review the death of William John Tesinsky, which occurred on October 4, 1986, in Yellowstone National Park, met in Mammoth Hot Springs on October 15 and 16, 1986. The Board heard testimony, reviewed evidence (physical and circumstantial), and visited the accident/incident scene. This report of the Board of Inquiry summarizes the facts associated with the three key elements in the death of William John Tesinsky. The three elements identified by the Board are: a personal profile of William John Tesinsky; a profile and detailed history of IGBST Grizzly Bear #59; and a reconstruction of the confrontation between Tesinsky and Bear #59 that resulted in Tesinsky's death. The report also contains the Board's determination as to the probable cause of Tesinsky's death, a discussion of the actions and circumstances which led to Tesinsky's death, and the Board's recommendations for additional management actions which may be used to help prevent similar incidents in the future. It should be noted that while the management recommendations were developed as a result of the Board's investigation into this specific case they are addressed to all management entities in the Greater Yellowstone Area responsible for managing grizzly bears.

The Board members were:

Walter Dabney; Chief, Ranger Activities, National Park Service,
Washington, D.C.

Stephen Frye; West District Ranger, Yellowstone National Park
Christopher Servheen; Grizzly Bear Recovery Coordinator, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Missoula, Montana

Robert Barbee; Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park

Dan Sholly; Chief Ranger, Yellowstone National Park

Richard Pippenger; Safety Officer, Yellowstone National Park

Stephen Mealey; Forest Supervisor, Shoshone National Forest, U.S. Forest
Service

Stephen Herrero; Professor of Environmental Science and Biology,
University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Larry Roop; Grizzly Bear Research Biologist, Wyoming Department of
Game and Fish

This report of the Board of Inquiry is presented as follows: 1) Introduction; 2) William John Tesinsky; 3) Bear #59; 4) The Conflict; 5) Probable Cause of Death; 6) Discussion; 7) Recommendations; and 8) Supporting Documents.

WILLIAM JOHN TESINSKY

At 0805 on 10/7/86 the remains of William John Tesinsky, a 38-year old white male from Great Falls, Montana, were discovered in an open meadow 3 miles south of the Canyon developed area in Yellowstone National Park. Following is a brief account of the facts concerning Tesinsky's activities from 10/3/86 - 10/7/86.

Tesinsky left the Great Falls area at approximately 1800 hours on the evening of 10/3/86 reportedly to travel to Clyde Park, Montana (a small rural community, 90 miles north of Yellowstone National Park), to meet with a rancher and possibly sell the rancher photographs Tesinsky had taken in the Clyde Park area. Tesinsky contacted a close friend at midnight Friday night (via collect phone call) which indicated to the friend that Tesinsky was safe in Clyde Park (this was a pre-arranged phone signal involving no conversation between Tesinsky and the friend). At this time there is no other evidence to substantiate that Tesinsky was in Clyde Park. Investigation is continuing to determine if Tesinsky ever did reach Clyde Park on 10/3/86 or 10/4/86 and if not, where the collect phone call originated. Further investigation as to the identity of the rancher is also continuing.

Tesinsky's vehicle was first observed in Yellowstone National Park at approximately 0700 on 10/4/86 at Cascade Meadows in the Canyon area. At 1100 hours on 10/4/86, Tesinsky's vehicle was observed parked along the Grand Loop Road in a pull-out/picnic area 3 miles south of Canyon. Tesinsky's vehicle remained in this pull-out until it was removed by park rangers on the afternoon of 10/7/86.

Rangers learned that Tesinsky had been reported as missing on the afternoon of 10/6/86, and organized a major search to commence on the morning of 10/7/86, the morning Tesinsky's body was discovered.

Following is a profile of William John Tesinsky developed through interviews with members of Tesinsky's family and Tesinsky's close friends.

William John Tesinsky
DOB - 11-15-47
SSN - 517-58-4820

William John Tesinsky was a 38-year old white male residing in Great Falls, Montana. Tesinsky was a mechanic by profession and had worked as a mechanic for 19 years in and around Great Falls, Montana. He was employed at the City Motors Chevrolet garage in Great Falls.

Tesinsky had been married and had three children: Monique, married and living in Great Falls; Shantel, also of Great Falls; and Pon, living with his mother in Florida. William Tesinsky had gone through a divorce approximately 18 months prior to his death. Tesinsky was described as relying on the sale of his photographs to help repay some outstanding financial obligations.

William Tesinsky was born and raised in the Little Belt Mountains area of Montana. By all accounts Tesinsky was an adept woodsman. He was described as an excellent hunter who was seldom without game.

Tesinsky was in good physical condition. He had suffered an injury to his right eye with some impairment and some chronic problems with an ankle, however, neither of these conditions were felt to be serious. Tesinsky is reported to have been an active outdoors person, capable of sustained high physical exertion. He seldom took anyone with him while hunting or photographing because he felt most people couldn't keep up.

Bill Tesinsky was an avid photographer. He had frequently stated a strong desire to become a professional wildlife photographer. Tesinsky's photographs, mostly of wildlife, were on display in galleries around the Great Falls area. Tesinsky was described as a "very determined" photographer who would do anything to get a photograph. There was an uncorroborated story about Tesinsky climbing down a cliff on a rope to get a picture of eagles in a nest.

Bill Tesinsky had recently told his brother that the only major animal in Montana that he did not have a picture of was the grizzly bear. Several friends and family, when informed that Tesinsky was in Yellowstone, felt his reason for coming to Yellowstone was to photograph bears.

William Tesinsky appeared to be a decisive, confident individual, physically fit and very experienced in hunting and outdoor skills. He was determined to get some good pictures. It would be in character for him to stalk and closely approach a grizzly to obtain a photograph.

During the investigation of the accident/incident scene the following personal items, including clothing were found in the vicinity of Tesinsky's remains:

Clothing: Camouflage hat (floppy type), camouflage zip front sweatshirt, a plaid cotton western style long-sleeved sport shirt, waffle weave thermal type long underwear shirt, blue jeans (on the lower torso), a leather belt with the name "Bill" engraved on the back, green/tan gaiters and high top tennis shoes. Tesinsky's right glove was in the pocket of his sweatshirt, the left glove was found inside out in the left sleeve of his sweatshirt.

Camera equipment: A Pentax K-1000 camera mounted on a Vivitar tripod. An 80mm-200mm zoom lens (camouflaged on the end) was attached to the camera. There was no lens cap on the camera nor was a lens cap found in the area. Lens caps were found in Tesinsky's vehicle. The camera/tripod were found lying on the ground. The camera settings were as follows: zoom lens setting 120mm; focus - infinity; f-stop - between 11 and 16; shutter speed - 1/60 sec.; ASA - 64 (which corresponded to the film in the camera). The 21st exposure was indicated in the film counter window. A leg on the tripod was bent (communication with family members indicates the tripod leg was not bent prior to this trip). There was mud and bear hair on the

tripod, and grass lying on the tripod. Mud and vegetation were firmly compacted into the hot shoe on the camera. There was dried blood on the camera lens and camera. A cable shutter release was attached to the camera but appeared to have been pulled out of the camera. The plastic foot from the bottom of one of the tripod legs (not the bent leg) was found approximately 15-20 feet from the tripod.

Other: Two film canisters containing unexposed ASA-64 Kodachrome 36 exposure film, similar to the film found in the camera, were found on the ground near the camera/tripod. A rubber tube-type elk bugle was found entangled on a sagebrush plant just above the camera/tripod. There was blood on the cord on the elk bugle and on the plant on which the bugle was entangled. A black rayon triangular scarf (knotted) which appeared to have been torn off (scarf was ripped 6" to the side of the knot).

Detailed maps, measurements, and a chronological sequence of events will appear as appendices to the report.

The following items were found in Tesinsky's vehicle, a blue 1963 Chevrolet Impala four door sedan, MT license 2-15426, VIN 31769J24486:

- 1 pair Optex model 135 10X50 binoculars, right front seat.
- 1 Meade 4.10 mirror 1000mm lens in black case. Lens and metal support were on right front floor of vehicle.
- 1 tanned elk hide with hair left on, left rear seat.
- 1 sleeping bag, left rear seat.
- 1 brown cowboy hat, middle rear seat.
- 1 pair brown size 7 1/2 Acme cowboy boots, one in right front seat, one in rear seat. Boot in front seat had a small maglight flashlight and lens cover in it.
- 1 camoflaue colored daypack on floor of right front seat containing 1 archery glove, 2 camera lens filters, 3 rolls of unexposed film, toilet paper, some light cord, 1 pentax tele-extender #N1-250mm, 1 right-hand shooting glove.
- glove box contents: 1 \$1.00 bill and misc. change, 1 key case with 5 keys, insurance and vehicle registration papers, 1 pair sunglasses, 1 Faulks P-60 predator call in original unopened container, 1 Yellowstone brochure/map.

BEAR NO. 59

The family history and origins of this bear are not known. She was first captured in 1980, in the Canyon area, in a trapping operation for another bear. She was 2 years old at the time. The bear was relocated 31.5 miles to High Lake, but returned to the Canyon area. Specifics on the capture history and radio location of this bear are attached. In July and August of 1981 she was frequenting the Canyon residential area. Her presence in a developed area and her apparent increasing habituation to people prompted management to initiate an effort to trap and relocate her. She was captured on 8/11/81 and relocated 25 miles to Saddle Mountain, but returned to the Canyon vicinity in 5 days.

In 1984, she was trapped twice in the Antelope Creek area during IGBST research efforts. The bear was monitored through '81, '82, '83, '84, and '85 as part of regular research monitoring. She was observed in the IGBST recreation study and displayed little reaction to study activities (copies of observations attached).

She first bred in 1983, at 5 years of age, and produced 2 cubs in 1984. She was last seen with her two cubs on 10/1/84 near her den site, but was seen with only 1 yearling in early 1985. By June 17, 1985, she had no yearling at her side and she apparently came into estrus and bred successfully.

Early in 1986 she was seen with two cubs of the year. She was frequenting the Canyon area in July and August 1986, and the Antelope Creek area prior to this time. She was photographed preying on elk calves in the Antelope Creek area in June with her cubs. By late July she was reported to be using a bison carcass in the Canyon area. In August she was verified in the Canyon area, grazing in the softball field, and walking near the campground. At this time, she was attracting crowds of people on a regular basis. On many occasions during this time, Bear #59 was observed and photographed, and displayed no aggression or even acknowledgement of people.

It is noteworthy that the bear was approached by two rangers when she had possession of Tesinsky's remains. The distance was 75-80 yards and the bear's response was to observe the rangers and move the remains 12 feet away from the rangers. She was heard to woof twice, after they backed off, but displayed no aggression again prior to being shot. However, she did show signs of becoming increasingly agitated with the ranger's presence immediately prior to being shot.

A bear thought to be #59 was seeking "people" food on several occasions in the Canyon area during 1986. On the evening of August 22, the bear attempted to enter an electric freezer illegally placed outside a trailer in the Canyon employee's residence area. The bear was sprayed with a fire extinguisher and scared away from the site (the distance from the bear to the person scaring it away was approximately 4 feet). No food was obtained. It is noteworthy that even at this close range, at night, the bear displayed no aggression toward the human.

The bear was also known to try to obtain garbage from Cascade Meadows Picnic Area garbage cans in August. Her use of this area was infrequent and she was not dependent on garbage for food.

Bear #59 was frequenting the Canyon area by late August and it was decided to move her and her cubs to prevent potential conflict.

On 9/4/86, Bear #59 was captured with her two cubs and moved 22 miles to Cub Creek. By 9/19 she had returned to the Canyon area and was without her cubs. She apparently left her cubs on her return to the Canyon area. She was located regularly in September in the Canyon area foraging for Yampa and Melica. Recent dig sites for these foods were found throughout the Otter Creek area through September and up to the time of the incident.

Bear #59 was radio located from Grand Loop Road in the Otter Creek area (by Steve French) on 10/3, 10/5, and the evening of 10/6. She was radio located by IGBST contract pilot Dave Stradley and observed in an open meadow at approximately 1000 hours on 10/6, 1/4 mile north of Otter Creek, approximately 1/2 mile north of the incident site. There were no observations, radio locations, or indications of any other bears in the Otter Creek incident site area from 10/3 to 10/7.

The area in the vicinity of the incident site had at least three large feeding areas where Melica and Yampa had been dug and fed upon by the bear. Two of these feeding sites are visible from the road and are approximately 400 yards from the road. The actual incident site is 450 yards straight line distance to the road and 568 yards by the most plausible walking route. The incident site is approximately 150-200 yards from the closest feeding site visible from the road. The incident site is also a Melica/Yampa feeding site. It is noteworthy that while the incident site is not visible from the road, the two other feeding sites along the logical approach path from the road to the incident site are visible from the road.

The incident site is not frequently visited by people according to rangers stationed in the area, observations by other long-time residents, and the limited human footprints in the area.

The bear was presumably first observed by Tesinsky from the road on the open slope and moved uphill to the third feeding site (incident site) on the morning of October 4. The wind was reported as blowing from the west. This wind direction would have allowed Tesinsky to approach from the road into the wind. If Tesinsky approached from the lower feeding sites along the most probable route, the bear could not have observed or smelled Tesinsky's approach until he crested the top of the hill.

In summary, Bear #59 was a bear that frequented the Canyon area for 7 years. She was familiar with the area and had many years of experience with people and human use in the area. Bear #59 would, on occasion, feed fairly close to large groups of people and would allow people to approach fairly close to her. She did attempt to obtain human foods on several occasions, but was not dependent upon them. The evidence indicates she obtained few, if any, food

rewards despite living in the area for 7 years. There is no evidence that the capture history or research encounters were related to the behavior of the bear. Available data on the feeding behavior and food habits of the bear indicate the bear was behaving normally. Although she was frequently in close proximity to large groups of people over an extended period of time there are no confirmed reports that she ever approached people in an aggressive or abnormal manner.

The specifics of the incident suggest a bear feeding on natural foods that was closely approached by a human. The bear possibly exhibited normal defensive behavior to an apparent close approach by the victim. She was a bear that was familiar with people, but despite numerous encounters, displayed no aggression toward humans until she killed Tesinsky. Her use of natural foods in the area was consistent with normal bear behavior. Bear #59 regularly chose to use developed areas despite the probability of encountering people. Throughout her life, until Bear #59 killed Tesinsky, her behavior toward people and vehicles can be described as tolerant.

In the few days prior to the incident, she was apparently feeding on natural fall bear foods by digging Melica and Yampa. Available evidence indicates that she was pursued to the incident site by the victim, where she was apparently occupied in normal feeding behavior. The incident site was one where she would not have expected to encounter people.

THE CONFLICT

It was established by Ranger Olliff on routine patrol that Tesinsky's vehicle was parked in a pull-out/picnic area just south of Otter Creek at 1100 hours on October 4, 1986. Since this vehicle was previously observed unoccupied and parked at Cascade Meadows by a visitor at 1000 hours, Tesinsky is known to have arrived at the Otter Creek parking area sometime between 1000 and 1100 on October 4. Two photographs of bison, subsequently found to be on the film in Tesinsky's camera were identified as having been taken at a location 3-4 miles south of Otter Creek in Hayden Valley. The weather and light conditions in the buffalo photographs were consistent with the mid-morning conditions of Saturday, 10/4. It is therefore believed that William Tesinsky, after leaving the Cascade Meadows area, drove south toward Hayden Valley where he stopped for an indefinite period and took the buffalo photographs found in his camera (the 19th and 20th frames on the film). Tesinsky then proceeded north to the site where his vehicle was last found. Allowing for driving time, and time out of the vehicle for taking photos, Tesinsky could not have arrived at Otter Creek more than a few minutes prior to 1100.

Tesinsky's vehicle aroused the attention of ranger personnel because the vehicle appeared hastily parked in a pullout. Since the vehicle was 23 years old and the manner of parking appeared hurried, it was thought perhaps that the vehicle had broken down and the operator had gone for assistance.

As previously indicated, there were at least three extensive bear digging/feeding sites in the general vicinity of where Tesinsky's remains were found. Two of these sites were visible from the highway, and, unless feeding activity was nocturnal, a bear utilizing these sites would have been visible to persons driving by on the road. The site of the fatality (not visible from the road), where a bear fed on and buried remains of Tesinsky and where Bear #59 was eventually killed while standing over and feeding on a portion of Tesinsky's body, was one of these feeding/digging areas. One of the two feeding sites visible from the road was approximately 100 yards east of the site of the fatality, between where Tesinsky's remains were found and the highway.

Feedsite analysis of the diggings in the area was completed by Interagency Grizzly Bear Study personnel on October 9, 1986. It was determined that the extensive amount of digging at the sites would have taken a bear approximately one half hour to one hour at each site. The bear was feeding primarily on Yampa, Melica, and pocket gophers. The age of the digs was considered to be less than one week old at the time they were analyzed.

The distance of the feeding site where the fatality occurred from the road was approximately 450 yards. A small knoll prevented observation of this site from the road. A person walking from the highway to this site would not see a bear feeding at this site until topping the small knoll; a person would then be only 40 yards from the center of the feeding site. The Mary Mountain

Trail parallels the road and is between the fatality site and the road. Most human travel in the area is along this trail.

Tesinsky's remains were found in an out-of-the-way site that would not appear to be a likely destination of an individual with little time in the park (Tesinsky was due back in Great Falls early on the evening of the 4th), and who was unfamiliar with the area. Rangers working in the area stated that people were seldom observed casually walking in this particular area. Based on the circumstances leading to the event, the physiognomy of the location, and the personality of the individual, it would appear that Tesinsky observed a bear from the road, hastily parked his vehicle, and pursued the animal for photographs.

Tesinsky's camera, found at the site, was attached to a tripod, had a cable release attached (the threads of the cable release were stripped, and the cable release fell off the camera when investigators picked up the camera and tripod), was lying on the ground with the tripod collapsed. The camera body was uphill of the tripod and closest to the spot where Tesinsky is thought to have been fatally injured.

Tesinsky's camera had an 80-200mm zoom lens set on 120mm, or about 2.5x. The aperture was set on F11-16, the focus was on infinity, and the shutter was on 1/60 sec.. All legs of the tripod were fully extended; one leg of the tripod was bent and slightly twisted about the midpoint. A plastic foot from one of the other tripod legs was detached and found lying downhill from the tripod and near the upper burial mound.

A drag trail started uphill from the camera/tripod, crossed the camera and tripod, and continued downhill (see figure). The camera was covered with dried blood and smeared with dirt and grass consistent with Tesinsky's body being dragged across it. Bear hair was found on two of the tripod legs. Dirt was jammed into the hot shoe on the camera as though it had been thrust or forcefully pushed into the ground.

It is believed that Tesinsky attempted to closely approach the bear, set up his camera and tripod, and was charged by the bear before he could take a photograph. The following would support this supposition:

1. The shutter of the camera was set on 1/60 sec., a shutter speed too slow for hand-holding a telephoto lens.
2. A cable release was attached to the camera, and it is extremely difficult to hand-hold a camera, focus a telephoto lens, and release the camera with a cable release. A cable release is ordinarily used in tripod set-ups.
3. The focus of the lens was set on infinity, but the focus of the camera could easily have been changed to this setting, particularly if the lens was struck from the front. Scuff marks, imbedded dirt on the front of the lens, and a loosened or wobbly lens body all appear to indicate the

lens was struck from the front.

4. The zoom lens was set on 120mm. This setting did not appear to be easily changed or altered accidentally. At this setting a bear would have appeared nearly full-frame at approximately 30-50 feet.
5. The bent leg on the tripod did not appear to be bent in a manner consistent with being stepped on while the tripod was in a collapsed state. The bend appeared to be one that would occur when the tripod was struck while set up with the tripod legs firmly braced.
6. Tesinsky appeared to use film conservatively, preferring to get close to his subject and taking only a few shots at full-frame range. Photographs in his camera, prints in his automobile, and statements from Tesinsky's friends and family support this assumption. To obtain better quality, high resolution photographs, a tripod and shorter focal length lens are preferred, necessitating close range photographs. A 1000mm, f-11 telephoto was left in the victim's car. This longer lens would not have provided as high resolution photographs and the light conditions might have prevented use of this lens with slow speed (Kodachrome 64) film. The final exposure on the victim's camera was an out-of-focus exposure, dark surface (no objects identifiable) with a light flare at the bottom of the frame. This exposure would be consistent with an accidental exposure taken of a dark, close object (the ground?) and a light flare coming from the eyepiece when the photographer did not have his eye to the camera.
7. Tesinsky is known to have been right-handed. His car keys were in his right pocket. His left glove was believed to have been on just prior to the attack, but the right glove was removed and placed in the front pocket of his sweatshirt, consistent with preparation for taking a photograph.
8. The foot missing from the tripod was not from the bent leg. It could have been dislodged when Tesinsky's body was dragged over the tripod and drug downhill. It could also have been jammed into the ground when the tripod was struck and pulled off as the tripod flew over, the camera and tripod landing uphill from the detached foot.

Approximately 10 yards uphill (toward the road) from where the camera and tripod were found was the beginning point of 35-40 foot long drag trail (see figure). At the origin of this drag trail, blood was found on the grass and splattered on vegetation. Sites of heavy blood loss are also evident further along the drag trail.

In addition, just uphill of the camera and tripod was an elk bugle with a nylon line attached. The nylon line was caught on a small sagebrush, the nylon line was blood-soaked, and the bugle was mashed and torn. It appears that the bugle was around Tesinsky's neck and was pulled off as the body was dragged back downhill.

The large amount of physical evidence at the scene supports the pathologist's autopsy report; that the death of the victim was due to traumatic injuries occurring from a bear attack.

PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH

The Board concurs with the pathologist's report which indicated that Tesinsky likely died due to injuries inflicted by a bear. The Board, on the basis of information available to it, concludes that the bear was IGBST Crizzly #59.

DISCUSSION

The grizzly/human conflict of October 4, 1986, resulting in the death of both, occurred apparently because of two primary factors:

1. William Tesinsky was motivated to travel approximately 550 yards from his car to the bear's location to photograph the bear, and;
2. the bear, when pursued and approached at close range was disposed to attack and kill Tesinsky.

Tesinsky appeared to have had a strong motivation to obtain grizzly photographs at close range. In deciding to pursue that objective, Tesinsky probably assumed he could safely approach and remain in close proximity to the bear.

Bear #59 can be understood behaviorally as an "habituated bear." Research in Glacier National Park, Montana, and observations in Yellowstone National Park, demonstrate that high levels of contact between grizzly bears and people result in some bears that often tolerate people at close distances. Animals normally flee when exposed to unusual, potentially threatening situations, such as people approaching. However, repeated exposure to such situations, if not followed by negative consequences, may result in an animal that does not flee as readily. Behavioral scientists refer to this waning of response upon repeated exposure to potentially threatening situations as habituation. A habituated bear will often allow people to approach more closely than a non-habituated bear. In some situations a habituated bear may approach people. Habituated bears retain most of their normal characteristics, however, their normal "flight distance" has been reduced.

Such bears have been called "neutral." However, while often allowing people to approach closely, such bears still have a point beyond which approach is not tolerated. At this point, often called the bear's "critical or individual distance," the bear does react, either by moving away or moving toward the person. Attack may result, thus making it clear that such a bear is not actually "neutral."

Bear #59 was habituated to the presence of people. It was approached and photographed at close range on hundreds of occasions. Mr. Tesinsky's character, and the nature and setting of his photographic equipment, suggest that he approached close to bear #59 to take photographs. Bear #59 was feeding on natural foods in an area where park visitors almost never go. In such a situation, bear #59 probably would not tolerate as close an approach by people as she would when in developed areas where people would be expected by the bear. We believe that bear #59's habituation allowed Mr. Tesinsky to approach, but that due to his desire to get good, albeit dangerous, photographs, he approached too closely and was attacked and killed.

Even with such provocation, it is unusual for a grizzly bear to kill a person, rather than injure them non-lethally. We can speculate, based on

information about Mr. Tesinsky's character, that when attacked, he fought the bear and thus precipitated further attack. There is, however, no physical evidence to support this view. After Mr. Tesinsky's death, apparently resulting from a defensive action by bear #59, the bear consumed part of the body. The circumstances do not suggest that the bear attacked and killed Mr. Tesinsky with the intent of preying on him. Rather, the circumstances suggest that Mr. Tesinsky approached and provoked the bear to attack.

There is no indication or evidence that the bear's physical condition, its' history of handling, drugging, and monitoring, or the low levels of the whitebark pine nut crop in the Yellowstone ecosystem were directly related to the incident.

The Board found that Yellowstone National Park officials acted appropriately in destroying bear #59, in accord with procedures outlined in the Interagency Grizzly Bear Management Guidelines.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations are only stated at the strategic level and are directed toward all land management agencies with grizzly bear responsibilities and other IGBC members. Specific measures to meet the strategic intent should be worked out at the ground level to assure practicality and workability.

The conflict could have been prevented if either or both of the contributing factors (Tesinsky's motivation and the bear's actions) could have been altered or eliminated.

Management actions directed at behavior modifications resulting in mutual (short range) avoidance are indicated. Since this is most achievable in humans, emphasis should continue to be placed on human behavior modification. Options include stricter enforcement of legal requirements and increased information initiatives. The goal should be to further increase all visitor's awareness, with special emphasis on photographers, of their great personal risk when within the presence of and certainly when closer than 100 yards to a grizzly.

We recognize that behavior modification in grizzlies is difficult once basic conditioning has occurred. We believe that, in general, habituation of grizzlies in any way is undesirable for both bears and humans and that we should continue to identify and eliminate habituating factors to the extent possible. The benefits and risks of maintaining as free-ranging or removing from the population, individual habituated grizzlies should be systematically determined on a case-by-case basis. This determination should follow procedures for "determining a nuisance bear" outlined in the Interagency Grizzly Bear Guidelines.

Three more specific recommendations are warranted:

1. Yellowstone National Park, other Greater Yellowstone Area management entities, and all agencies responsible for managing grizzly bears should review/develop action plans to further increase visitor's awareness of their great personal risk when they are in close proximity to a grizzly.
2. Yellowstone National Park, other Greater Yellowstone Area management entities, and all agencies responsible for managing grizzly bears should review action plans to insure that appropriate efforts are being made to avoid habituation of grizzlies and to manage those grizzlies that are habituated.
3. The Board recommends that any personnel approaching a situation potentially involving a grizzly bear and a carcass be armed with rifles or shotguns as a matter of course. The Board makes this obvious recommendation to emphasize the very real danger the rangers were in as

they approached the scene on the morning of 10/7/86 (in that they were only carrying their law enforcement issued sidearms), and to eliminate any question as to the appropriateness of having been heavily armed in this situation.